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Abstract
We present an elementary proof of the quantum de Finetti representation
theorem, a quantum analogue of de Finetti’s classical theorem on exchange-
able probability assignments. This contrasts with the original proof of Hud-
son and Moody [Z. Wahrschein. verw. Geb. 33, 343 (1976)], which relies on
advanced mathematics and does not share the same potential for generaliza-
tion. The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of
the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where
probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of na-
ture. The quantum de Finetti theorem, in a closely analogous fashion, deals
with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational
definition of the concept of an “unknown quantum state” in quantum-state
tomography. This result is especially important for information-based inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics, where quantum states, like probabilities,
are taken to be states of knowledge rather than states of nature. We further
demonstrate that the theorem fails for real Hilbert spaces and discuss the
significance of this point.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a quantum state? Since the earliest days of quantum theory, the predominant
answer has been that the quantum state is a representation of the observer’s knowledge
of a system [1]. In and of itself, the quantum state has no objective reality [2]. The
authors hold this information-based view quite firmly [3,4]. Despite its association with
the founders of quantum theory, however, holding this view does not require a concomitant
belief that there is nothing left to learn in quantum foundations. It is quite the opposite
in fact: Only by pursuing a promising, but incomplete program can one hope to learn
something of lasting value. Challenges to the information-based view arise regularly, and
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dealing with these challenges builds an understanding and a problem-solving agility that
reading and rereading the founders can never engender [5]. With each challenge successfully
resolved, one walks away with a deeper sense of the physical content of quantum theory and a
growing confidence for tackling questions of its interpretation and applicability. Questions as
fundamental and distinct as “Will a nonlinear extension of quantum mechanics be needed to
quantize gravity?” [6,7] and “Which physical resources actually make quantum computation
efficient?” [8,9] start to feel tractable (and even connected) from this perspective.
In this paper, we tackle an understanding-building exercise very much in the spirit of
these remarks. It is motivated by an apparent conundrum arising from our own specialization
in physics, quantum information theory. The issue is that of the unknown quantum state.
There is hardly a paper in the field of quantum information that does not make use of
the idea of an “unknown quantum state.” Unknown quantum states are teleported [10,11],
protected with quantum error correcting codes [12,13], and used to check for quantum eaves-
dropping [14,15]. The list of uses, already long, grows longer each day. Yet what can the
term “unknown quantum state” mean? In an information-based interpretation of quantum
mechanics, the term is an oxymoron: If quantum states, by their very definition, are states
of knowledge and not states of nature [16], then the state is known by someone—at the very
least, by the describer himself.
This message is the main point of our paper. Faced with a procedure that uses the idea of
an unknown quantum state in its description, a consistent information-based interpretation
of quantum mechanics offers only two alternatives:
• The owner of the unknown state—a further decision-making agent or observer—must
be explicitly identified. In this case, the unknown state is merely a stand-in for the
unknown state of knowledge of an essential player who went unrecognized in the original
formulation.
• If there is clearly no further decision-making agent or observer on the scene, then a way
must be found to ree¨xpress the procedure with the term “unknown state” banished
from the formulation. In this case, the end-product of the effort is a single quantum
state used for describing the entire procedure—namely, the state that captures the
describer’s state of knowledge.
Of course, those inclined to an objectivist interpretation of quantum mechanics [17]—
that is, an interpretation where quantum states are more like states of nature than states of
knowledge—might be tempted to believe that the scarcity of existing analyses of this kind
is a hint that quantum states do indeed have some sort of objective status. Why would
such currency be made of the unknown-state concept were it not absolutely necessary? As
a rejoinder, we advise caution to the objectivist: Tempting though it is to grant objective
status to all the mathematical objects in a physical theory, there is much to be gained by
a careful delineation of the subjective and objective parts. A case in point is provided by
E. T. Jaynes’ [18–20] insistence that entropy is a subjective quantity, a measure of ignorance
about a physical system. One of the many fruits of this point of view can be found in the
definitive solution [21] to the long-standing Maxwell demon problem [22], where it was
realized that the information collected by a demon and used by it to extract work from heat
has a thermodynamic cost at least as large as the work extracted [23].
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FIG. 1. What can the term “unknown state” mean if quantum states are taken exclusively to
be states of knowledge rather than states of nature? When we say that a system has an unknown
state, must we always imagine a further observer whose state of knowledge is symbolized by some
|ψ〉, and it is the identity of the symbol that we are ignorant of?
The example analyzed in detail in this paper provides another case. Along the way, it
brings to light a new and distinct point about why quantum mechanics makes use of complex
Hilbert spaces rather than real or quaternionic ones [24–27]. Furthermore, the method we
use to prove our main theorem employs a novel measurement technique that might be of
use in the laboratory.
We analyze in depth a particular use of unknown states, which comes from the mea-
surement technique known as quantum-state tomography [28–30]. The usual description of
tomography is this. A device of some sort, say a nonlinear optical medium driven by a laser,
repeatedly prepares many instances of a quantum system, say many temporally distinct
modes of the electromagnetic field, in a fixed quantum state ρ, pure or mixed. An experi-
mentalist who wishes to characterize the operation of the device or to calibrate it for future
use might be able to perform measurements on the systems it prepares even if he cannot get
at the device itself. This can be useful if the experimenter has some prior knowledge of the
device’s operation that can be translated into a probability distribution over states. Then
learning about the state will also be learning about the device. Most importantly, though,
this description of tomography assumes that the precise state ρ is unknown. The goal of the
experimenter is to perform enough measurements, and enough kinds of measurements (on a
large enough sample), to estimate the identity of ρ.
This is clearly an example where there is no further player on whom to pin the unknown
state as a state of knowledge. Any attempt to find a player for the pin is entirely artificial:
Where would the player be placed? On the inside of the device the tomographer is trying
to characterize [31]? The only available course for an information-based interpretation of
quantum-state tomography is the second strategy listed above—to banish completely the
idea of the unknown state from the formulation of tomography.
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FIG. 2. To make sense of quantum tomography, must we go to the extreme of imagining a
“man in the box” who has a better description of the systems than we do? How contrived our
usage would be if that were so!
To do this, we take a cue from the field of Bayesian probability theory [32–34], prompted
by the realization that Bayesian probability is to probability theory in general what an
information-based interpretation is to quantum mechanics [3,35]. In Bayesian theory, prob-
abilities are not objective states of nature, but rather are taken explicitly to be measures
of credible belief, reflecting one’s state of knowledge. The overarching Bayesian theme is
to identify the conditions under which a set of decision-making agents can come to a com-
mon belief or probability assignment for a random variable even though their initial beliefs
differ [34]. Following that theme is the key to understanding tomography from the informa-
tional point of view.
The offending classical concept is an “unknown probability,” an oxymoron for the same
reason as an unknown quantum state. The procedure analogous to quantum-state tomogra-
phy is the estimation of an unknown probability from the results of repeated trials on “iden-
tically prepared systems,” all of which are said to be described by the same, but unknown
probability. The way to eliminate unknown probabilities from the discussion, introduced
by Bruno de Finetti in the early 1930s [36,37], is to focus on the equivalence of repeated
trials, which means the systems are indistinguishable as far as probabilistic predictions are
concerned and thus that a probability assignment for multiple trials should be symmetric
under permutation of the systems. With his classical representation theorem, de Finetti
[36] showed that a multi-trial probability assignment that is permutation-symmetric for an
arbitrarily large number of trials—de Finetti called such multi-trial probabilities exchange-
able—is equivalent to a probability for the “unknown probabilities.” Thus the unsatisfactory
concept of an unknown probability vanishes from the description in favor of the fundamental
idea of assigning an exchangeable probability distribution to multiple trials.
This cue in hand, it is easy to see how to reword the description of quantum-state
tomography to meet our goals. What is relevant is simply a judgment on the part of the
experimenter—notice the essential subjective character of this “judgment”—that there is no
distinction between the systems the device is preparing. In operational terms, this is the
judgment that all the systems are and will be the same as far as observational predictions are
concerned. At first glance this statement might seem to be contentless, but the important
point is this: To make this statement, one need never use the notion of an unknown state—
a completely operational description is good enough. Putting it into technical terms, the
statement is that if the experimenter judges a collection of N of the device’s outputs to have
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an overall quantum state ρ(N), he will also judge any permutation of those outputs to have
the same quantum state ρ(N). Moreover, he will do this no matter how large the number N
is. This, complemented only by the consistency condition that for any N the state ρ(N) be
derivable from ρ(N+1), makes for the complete story.
The words “quantum state” appear in this formulation, just as in the original formulation
of tomography, but there is no longer any mention of unknown quantum states. The state
ρ(N) is known by the experimenter (if no one else), for it represents his state of knowledge.
More importantly, the experimenter is in a position to make an unambiguous statement
about the structure of the whole sequence of states ρ(N): Each of the states ρ(N) has a
kind of permutation invariance over its factors. The content of the quantum de Finetti
representation theorem [38,39]—a new proof of which is the main technical result of this
paper—is that a sequence of states ρ(N) can have these properties, which are said to make
it an exchangeable sequence, if and only if each term in it can also be written in the form
ρ(N) =
∫
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ , (1.1)
where
ρ⊗N = ρ⊗ ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
N -fold tensor
product
(1.2)
and P (ρ) is a fixed probability distribution over the density operators.
The interpretive import of this theorem is paramount. It alone gives a mandate to the
term unknown state in the usual description of tomography. It says that the experimenter
can act as if his state of knowledge ρ(N) comes about because he knows there is a “man in
the box,” hidden from view, repeatedly preparing the same state ρ. He does not know which
such state, and the best he can say about the unknown state is captured in the probability
distribution P (ρ).
The quantum de Finetti theorem furthermore makes a connection to the overarching
theme of Bayesianism stressed above. It guarantees for two independent observers—as
long as they have a rather minimal agreement in their initial beliefs—that the outcomes
of a sufficiently informative set of measurements will force a convergence in their state
assignments for the remaining systems [40]. This “minimal” agreement is characterized
by a judgment on the part of both parties that the sequence of systems is exchangeable,
as described above, and a promise that the observers are not absolutely inflexible in their
opinions. Quantitatively, the latter means that though P (ρ) might be arbitrarily close to
zero, it can never vanish.
This coming to agreement works because an exchangeable density operator sequence can
be updated to reflect information gathered from measurements by a quantum version of
Bayes’s rule for updating probabilities. Specifically, if measurements on K systems yield
results DK , then the state of additional systems is constructed as in Eq. (1.1), but using an
updated probability on density operators given by
P (ρ|DK) = P (DK |ρ)P (ρ)
P (DK)
. (1.3)
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Here P (DK |ρ) is the probability to obtain the measurement results DK , given the state
ρ⊗K for the K measured systems, and P (DK) =
∫
P (DK|ρ)P (ρ) dρ is the unconditional
probability for the measurement results. Equation (1.3) is a kind of quantum Bayes rule
[40]. For a sufficiently informative set of measurements, as K becomes large, the updated
probability P (ρ|DK) becomes highly peaked on a particular state ρDK dictated by the mea-
surement results, regardless of the prior probability P (ρ), as long as P (ρ) is nonzero in a
neighborhood of ρDK . Suppose the two observers have different initial beliefs, encapsulated
in different priors Pi(ρ), i = 1, 2. The measurement results force them to a common state
of knowledge in which any number N of additional systems are assigned the product state
ρ⊗NDK , i.e., ∫
Pi(ρ|DK) ρ⊗N dρ −→ ρ⊗NDK , (1.4)
independent of i, for K sufficiently large.
This shifts the perspective on the purpose of quantum-state tomography: It is not about
uncovering some “unknown state of nature,” but rather about the various observers’ coming
to agreement over future probabilistic predictions [41]. In this connection, it is interesting to
note that the quantum de Finetti theorem and the conclusions just drawn from it work only
within the framework of complex vector-space quantum mechanics. For quantum mechanics
based on real and quaternionic Hilbert spaces [24,25], the connection between exchangeable
density operators and unknown quantum states does not hold.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II we discuss the classical
de Finetti representation theorem [36,42] in the context of Bayesian probability theory. It
was our familiarity with the classical theorem [43,44] that motivated our reconsideration
of quantum-state tomography. In Sec. III we introduce the information-based formulation
of tomography in terms of exchangeable multi-system density operators, accompanied by a
critical discussion of objectivist formulations of tomography, and we state the quantum de
Finetti representation theorem. Section IV presents an elementary proof of the quantum de
Finetti theorem. There, also, we introduce a novel measurement technique for tomography
based upon generalized quantum measurements. Finally, in Sec. V we return to the issue of
number fields in quantum mechanics and mention possible extensions of the main theorem.
II. THE CLASSICAL DE FINETTI THEOREM
As a preliminary to the quantum problem, we turn our attention to classical probability
theory. In doing so we follow a maxim of the late E. T. Jaynes [45]:
We think it unlikely that the role of probability in quantum theory will be un-
derstood until it is generally understood in classical theory . . . . Indeed, our
[seventy-five-year-old] bemusement over the notion of state reduction in [quan-
tum theory] need not surprise us when we note that today, in all applications of
probability theory, basically the same controversy rages over whether our prob-
abilities represent real situations, or only incomplete human knowledge.
As Jaynes makes clear, the tension between the objectivist and informational points of
view is not new with quantum mechanics. It arises already in classical probability the-
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ory in the form of the war between “objective” and “subjective” interpretations [46]. Ac-
cording to the subjective or Bayesian interpretation, probabilities are measures of credible
belief, reflecting an agent’s potential states of knowledge. On the other hand, the objec-
tive interpretations—in all their varied forms, from frequency interpretations to propensity
interpretations—attempt to view probabilities as real states of affairs or “states of nature.”
Following our discussion in Sec. I, it will come as no surprise to the reader that the authors
wholeheartedly adopt the Bayesian approach. For us, the ultimate reason is simply our own
experience with this question, part of which is an appreciation that objective interpretations
inevitably run into insurmountable difficulties. We will not dwell upon these difficulties here;
instead, the reader can find a sampling of criticisms in Refs. [20,32–34,47].
We will note briefly, however, that the game of roulette provides an illuminating example.
In the European version of the game, the possible outcomes are the numbers 0, 1, . . . , 36.
For a player without any privileged information, all 37 outcomes have the same probability
p = 1/37. But suppose that shortly after the ball is launched by the croupier, another
player obtains information about the ball’s position and velocity relative to the wheel. Using
the information obtained, this other player can make more accurate predictions than the
first [48]. His probability is peaked around some group of numbers. The probabilities are
thus different for two players with different states of knowledge.
Whose probability is the true probability? From the Bayesian viewpoint, this question
is meaningless: There is no such thing as a true probability. All probability assignments are
subjective assignments based specifically upon one’s prior information.
For sufficiently precise data—including precise initial data on positions and velocities and
probably also including other details such as surface properties of the wheel—Newtonian me-
chanics assures us that the outcome can be predicted with certainty. This is an important
point: The determinism of classical physics provides a strong reason for adopting the subjec-
tivist view of probabilities [49]. If the conditions of a trial are exactly specified, the outcomes
are predictable with certainty, and all probabilities are 0 or 1. In a deterministic theory,
all probabilities strictly greater than 0 and less than 1 arise as a consequence of incomplete
information and depend upon their assigner’s state of knowledge.
Of course, we should keep in mind that our ultimate goal is to consider the status of
quantum states and, by way of them, quantum probabilities. One can ask, “Does this
not change the flavor of these considerations?” Since quantum mechanics is avowedly not
a theory of one’s ignorance of a set of hidden variables [50,51], how can the probabilities
be subjective? In Sec. III we argue that despite the intrinsic indeterminism of quantum
mechanics, the essence of the point above carries over to the quantum setting intact. Fur-
thermore, there are specifically quantum-motivated arguments for a Bayesian interpretation
of quantum probabilities.
For the present, though, let us consider in some detail the general problem of a repeated
experiment—spinning a roulette wheel N times is an example. As discussed briefly in Sec. I,
this allows us to make a conceptual connection to quantum-state tomography. Here the
individual trials are described by discrete random variables xn ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, n = 1, . . . , N ;
that is to say, there are N random variables, each of which can assume k discrete values. In
an objectivist theory, such an experiment has a standard formulation in which the probability
in the multi-trial hypothesis space is given by an independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.)
distribution
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p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = px1px2 · · ·pxN = pn11 pn22 · · · pnkk . (2.1)
The number pj (j = 1, . . . , k) describes the objective, “true” probability that the result of a
single experiment will be j (j = 1, . . . , k). The variable nj , on the other hand, is the number
of times outcome j is listed in the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xN). This simple description—for the
objectivist—only describes the situation from a kind of “God’s eye” point of view. To the
experimentalist, the “true” probabilities p1, . . . , pk will very often be unknown at the outset.
Thus, his burden is to estimate the unknown probabilities by a statistical analysis of the
experiment’s outcomes.
In the Bayesian approach, it does not make sense to talk about estimating a true prob-
ability. Instead, a Bayesian assigns a prior probability distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) on the
multi-trial hypothesis space, which is generally not an i.i.d., and then uses Bayes’s theorem
to update the distribution in the light of measurement results. A common criticism from the
objectivist camp is that the choice of distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) with which to start the
process seems overly arbitrary to them. On what can it be grounded, they would ask? From
the Bayesian viewpoint, the subjectivity of the prior is a strength rather than a weakness,
because assigning a prior amounts to laying bare the necessarily subjective assumptions be-
hind any probabilistic argument, be it Bayesian or objectivist. Choosing a prior among all
possible distributions on the multi-trial hypothesis space is, however, a daunting task. As
we will now see, the de Finetti representation theorem makes this task tractable.
It is very often the case that one or more features of a problem stand out so clearly
that there is no question about how to incorporate them into an initial assignment. In the
present case, the key feature is contained in the assumption that an arbitrary number of
repeated trials are equivalent. This means that one has no reason to believe there will be
a difference between one trial and the next. In this case, the prior distribution is judged
to have the sort of permutation symmetry discussed briefly in Sec. I, which de Finetti [37]
called exchangeability. The rigorous definition of exchangeability proceeds in two stages.
A probability distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) is said to be symmetric (or finitely exchange-
able) if it is invariant under permutations of its arguments, i.e., if
p(xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(N)) = p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) (2.2)
for any permutation π of the set {1, . . . , N}. The distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) is called
exchangeable (or infinitely exchangeable) if it is symmetric and if for any integer M > 0,
there is a symmetric distribution pN+M(x1, x2, . . . , xN+M) such that
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) =
∑
xN+1,...,xN+M
pN+M(x1, . . . , xN , xN+1, . . . , xN+M) . (2.3)
This last statement means the distribution p can be extended to a symmetric distribution
of arbitrarily many random variables. Expressed informally, an exchangeable distribution
can be thought of as arising from an infinite sequence of random variables whose order is
irrelevant.
We now come to the main statement of this section: if a probability distribution
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) is exchangeable, then it can be written uniquely in the form
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) =
∫
Sk
P (p) px1px2 · · · pxN dp =
∫
Sk
P (p) pn11 p
n2
2 · · · pnkk dp , (2.4)
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where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), and the integral is taken over the probability simplex
Sk =
p : pj ≥ 0 for all j and
k∑
j=1
pj = 1
 . (2.5)
Furthermore, the function P (p) ≥ 0 is required to be a probability density function on the
simplex: ∫
Sk
P (p) dp = 1 . (2.6)
Equation (2.4) comprises the classical de Finetti representation theorem for discrete random
variables. For completeness and because it deserves to be more widely familiar in the physics
community, we give a simple proof (due to Heath and Sudderth [42]) of the representation
theorem for the binary random-variable case in an Appendix.
Let us reiterate the importance of this result for the present considerations. It says that
an agent, making solely the judgment of exchangeability for a sequence of random variables
xj , can proceed as if his state of knowledge had instead come about through ignorance
of an unknown, but objectively existent set of probabilities p. His precise ignorance of p
is captured by the “probability on probabilities” P (p). This is in direct analogy to what
we desire of a solution to the problem of the unknown quantum state in quantum-state
tomography.
As a final note before finally addressing the quantum problem in Sec. III, we point out
that both conditions in the definition of exchangeability are crucial for the proof of the de
Finetti theorem. In particular, there are probability distributions p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) that are
symmetric, but not exchangeable. A simple example is the distribution p(x1, x2) of two
binary random variables x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1},
p(0, 0) = p(1, 1) = 0 , (2.7)
p(0, 1) = p(1, 0) =
1
2
. (2.8)
One can easily check that p(x1, x2) cannot be written as the marginal of a symmetric dis-
tribution of three variables, as in Eq. (2.3). Therefore it can have no representation along
the lines of Eq. (2.4). (For an extended discussion of this, see Ref. [52].) Indeed, Eqs. (2.7)
and (2.8) characterize a perfect “anticorrelation” of the two variables, in contrast to the
positive correlation implied by distributions of de Finetti form. The content of this point
is that both conditions in the definition of exchangeability (symmetry under interchange
and infinite extendibility) are required to ensure, in colloquial terms, “that the future will
appear much as the past” [53], rather than, say, the opposite of the past.
III. THE QUANTUM DE FINETTI REPRESENTATION
Let us now return to the problem of quantum-state tomography described in Sec. I. In
the objectivist formulation of the problem, a device repeatedly prepares copies of a system
in the same quantum state ρ. This is generally a mixed-state density operator on a Hilbert
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space Hd of d dimensions. We call the totality of such density operators Dd. The joint
quantum state of the N systems prepared by the device is then given by
ρ⊗N = ρ⊗ ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ , (3.1)
the N -fold tensor product of ρ with itself. This, of course, is a very restricted example
of a density operator on the tensor-product Hilbert space H⊗Nd ≡ Hd ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hd. The
experimenter, who performs quantum-state tomography, tries to determine ρ as precisely as
possible. Depending upon the version of the argument, ρ is interpreted as the “true” state
of each of the systems or as a description of the “true” preparation procedure.
We have already articulated our dissatisfaction with this way of stating the problem, but
we give here a further sense of why both interpretations above are untenable. Let us deal
first with the version where ρ is regarded as the true, objective state of each of the systems.
In this discussion it is useful to consider separately the cases of mixed and pure states ρ.
The arguments against regarding mixed states as objective properties of a quantum system
are essentially the same as those against regarding probabilities as objective. In analogy to
the roulette example given in the previous section, we can say that, whenever an observer
assigns a mixed state to a physical system, one can think of another observer who assigns a
different state based on privileged information.
The quantum argument becomes yet more compelling if the apparently nonlocal nature
of quantum states is taken into consideration. Consider two parties, A and B, who are far
apart in space, say several light years apart. Each party possesses a spin- 1
2
particle. Initially
the joint state of the two particles is the maximally entangled pure state 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉).
Consequently, A assigns the totally mixed state 1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) to her own particle. Now
B makes a measurement on his particle, finds the result 0, and assigns to A’s particle the
pure state |0〉. Is this now the “true,” objective state of A’s particle? At what precise time
does the objective state of A’s particle change from totally mixed to pure? If the answer
is “simultaneously with B’s measurement,” then what frame of reference should be used
to determine simultaneity? These questions and potential paradoxes are avoided if states
are interpreted as states of knowledge. In our example, A and B have different states of
knowledge and therefore assign different states. For a detailed analysis of this example, see
Ref. [54]; for an experimental investigation see Ref. [55].
If one admits that mixed states cannot be objective properties, because another observer,
possessing privileged information, can know which pure state underlies the mixed state, then
it becomes very tempting to regard the pure states as giving the “true” state of a system.
Probabilities that come from pure states would then be regarded as objective, and the
probabilities for pure states within an ensemble decomposition of a mixed state would be
regarded as subjective, expressing our ignorance of which pure state is the “true” state of
the system. An immediate and, in our view, irremediable problem with this idea is that a
mixed state has infinitely many ensemble decompositions into pure states [19,56,57], so the
distinction between subjective and objective becomes hopelessly blurred.
This problem can be made concrete by the example of a spin-1
2
particle. Any pure state
of the particle can be written in terms of the Pauli matrices,
σ1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σ2 =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σ3 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, (3.2)
10
as
|n〉〈n| = 1
2
(I + n · σ) = 1
2
(I + n1σ1 + n2σ2 + n3σ3) , (3.3)
where the unit vector n = n1e1 + n2e2 + n3e3 labels the pure state, and I denotes the unit
operator. An arbitrary state ρ, mixed or pure, of the particle can be expressed as
ρ =
1
2
(I + S · σ) , (3.4)
where 0 ≤ |S| ≤ 1. This representation of the states of a spin-1
2
particle is called the Bloch-
sphere representation. If |S| < 1, there is an infinite number of ways in which S can be
written in the form S =
∑
j pjnj , |nj | = 1, with the numbers pj comprising a probability
distribution, and hence an infinite number of ensemble decompositions of ρ:
ρ =
∑
j
pj
1
2
(I + nj · σ) =
∑
j
pj|nj〉〈nj| . (3.5)
Suppose for specificity that the particle’s state is a mixed state with S = 1
2
e3. Writing
S = 3
4
e3 +
1
4
(−e3) gives the eigendecomposition,
ρ =
3
4
|e3〉〈e3|+ 1
4
|−e3〉〈−e3| , (3.6)
where we are to regard the probabilities 3/4 and 1/4 as subjective expressions of ignorance
about which eigenstate is the “true” state of the particle. Writing S = 1
2
n+ +
1
2
n−, where
n± = 12e3 ±
√
3
2
ex, gives another ensemble decomposition,
ρ =
1
2
|n+〉〈n+|+ 1
2
|n−〉〈n−| , (3.7)
where we are now to regard the two probabilities of 1/2 as expressing ignorance of whether
the “true” state is |n+〉 or |n−〉.
The problem becomes acute when we ask for the probability that a measurement of the z
component of spin yields spin up; this probability is given by 〈e3|ρ|e3〉 = 12(1+ 12〈e3|σ3|e3〉) =
3/4. The eigendecomposition gets this probability by the route
〈e3|ρ|e3〉 = 3
4
|〈e3|e3〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+
1
4
|〈e3|−e3〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
. (3.8)
Here the “objective” quantum probabilities, calculated from the eigenstates, report that the
particle definitely has spin up or definitely has spin down; the overall probability of 3/4
comes from mixing these objective probabilities with the subjective probabilities for the
eigenstates. The decomposition (3.7) gets the same overall probability by a different route,
〈e3|ρ|e3〉 = 1
2
|〈e3|n+〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
3/4
+
1
2
|〈e3|n−〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
3/4
. (3.9)
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Now the quantum probabilities tell us that the “objective” probability for the particle to
have spin up is 3/4. This simple example illustrates the folly of trying to have two kinds of
probabilities in quantum mechanics. The lesson is that if a density operator is even partially
a reflection of one’s state of knowledge, the multiplicity of ensemble decomposition means
that a pure state must also be a state of knowledge.
Return now to the second version of the objectivist formulation of tomography, in which
the experimenter is said to be using quantum-state tomography to determine an unknown
preparation procedure. Imagine that the tomographic reconstruction results in the mixed
state ρ, rather than a pure state, as in fact all actual laboratory procedures do. Now there is a
serious problem, because a mixed state does not correspond to a well-defined procedure, but
is itself a probabilistic mixture of well-defined procedures, i.e., pure states. The experimenter
is thus trying to determine an unknown procedure that has no unique decomposition into
well defined procedures. Thus he cannot be said to be determining an unknown procedure at
all. This problem does not arise in an information-based interpretation, according to which
all quantum states, pure or mixed, are states of knowledge. In analogy to the classical case,
the quantum de Finetti representation provides an operational definition for the idea of an
unknown quantum state in this case.
Let us therefore turn to the information-based formulation of the quantum-state tomog-
raphy problem. Before the tomographic measurements, the Bayesian experimenter assigns a
prior quantum state to the joint system composed of the N systems, reflecting his prior state
of knowledge. Just as in the classical case, this is a daunting task unless the assumption of
exchangeability is justified.
The definition of the quantum version of exchangeability is closely analogous to the
classical definition. Again, the definition proceeds in two stages. First, a joint state ρ(N)
of N systems is said to be symmetric (or finitely exchangeable) if it is invariant under
any permutation of the systems. To see what this means formally, first write out ρ(N)
with respect to any orthonormal tensor-product basis on H⊗Nd , say |i1〉|i2〉 · · · |iN〉, where
ik ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} for all k . The joint state takes the form
ρ(N) =
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN |i1〉 · · · |iN〉〈j1| · · · 〈jN | , (3.10)
where R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
is the density matrix in this representation. What we demand is that
for any permutation π of the set {1, . . . , N},
ρ(N) =
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
|ipi−1(1)〉 · · · |ipi−1(N)〉〈jpi−1(1)| · · · 〈jpi−1(N)|
=
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
R
(N)
ipi(1),...,ipi(N);jpi(1),...,jpi(N)
|i1〉 · · · |iN〉〈j1| · · · 〈jN | , (3.11)
which is equivalent to
R
(N)
ipi(1),...,ipi(N);jpi(1),...,jpi(N)
= R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
. (3.12)
The state ρ(N) is said to be exchangeable (or infinitely exchangeable) if it is symmetric
and if, for any M > 0, there is a symmetric state ρ(N+M) of N +M systems such that the
marginal density operator for N systems is ρ(N), i.e.,
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ρ(N) = trM ρ
(N+M) , (3.13)
where the trace is taken over the additionalM systems. In explicit basis-dependent notation,
this requirement is
ρ(N) =
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
 ∑
iN+1,...,iN+M
R
(N+M)
i1,...,iN ,iN+1,...,iN+M ;j1,...,jN ,iN+1,...,iN+M
|i1〉 · · · |iN 〉〈j1| · · · 〈jN | .
(3.14)
In analogy to the classical case, an exchangeable density operator can be thought of infor-
mally as the description of a subsystem of an infinite sequence of systems whose order is
irrelevant.
The precise statement of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem [38,58] is that
any exchangeable state of N systems can be written uniquely in the form
ρ(N) =
∫
Dd
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ . (3.15)
Here P (ρ) ≥ 0 is normalized by ∫
Dd
P (ρ) dρ = 1 , (3.16)
with dρ being a suitable measure on density operator space Dd [e.g., one could choose the
standard flat measure dρ = S2dS dΩ in the parametrization (3.4) for a spin-1
2
particle]. The
upshot of the theorem, as already advertised, is that it makes it possible to think of an
exchangeable quantum-state assignment as if it were a probabilistic mixture characterized
by a probability density P (ρ) for the product states ρ⊗N .
Just as in the classical case, both components of the definition of exchangeability are
crucial for arriving at the representation theorem of Eq. (3.15). The reason now, however,
is much more interesting than it was previously. In the classical case, extendibility was used
solely to exclude anticorrelated probability distributions. Here extendibility is necessary
to exclude the possibility of Bell inequality violations for measurements on the separate
systems. This is because the assumption of symmetry alone for an N -party quantum sys-
tem does not exclude the possibility of quantum entanglement, and all states that can be
written as a mixture of product states—of which Eq. (3.15) is an example—have no en-
tanglement [59]. A very simple counterexample is the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state of
three spin-1
2
particles [60],
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉|1〉
)
, (3.17)
which is symmetric, but is not extendible to a symmetric state on four systems. This follows
because the only states of four particles that marginalize to a three-particle pure state, like
the GHZ state, are product states of the form |GHZ〉〈GHZ| ⊗ ρ, where ρ is the state of
the fourth particle; such states clearly cannot be symmetric. These considerations show
that in order for the proposed theorem to be valid, it must be the case that as M increases
in Eq. (3.13), the possibilities for entanglement in the separate systems compensatingly
decrease [61].
13
IV. PROOF OF THE QUANTUM DE FINETTI THEOREM
To prove the quantum version of the de Finetti theorem, we rely on the classical theorem
as much as possible. We start from an exchangeable density operator ρ(N) defined on N
copies of a system. We bring the classical theorem to our aid by imagining a sequence
of identical quantum measurements on the separate systems and considering the outcome
probabilities they would produce. Because ρ(N) is assumed exchangeable, such identical
measurements give rise to an exchangeable probability distribution for the outcomes. The
trick is to recover enough information from the exchangeable statistics of these measurements
to characterize the exchangeable density operators.
With this in mind, the proof is expedited by making use of the theory of generalized
quantum measurements or positive operator-valued measures (POVMs) [62,63]. We give
a brief introduction to that theory. The common textbook notion of a measurement—
that is, a von Neumann measurement—is that any laboratory procedure counting as an
observation can be identified with a Hermitian operator O on the Hilbert space Hd of the
system. Depending upon the presentation, the measurement outcomes are identified either
with the eigenvalues µi or with a complete set of normalized eigenvectors |i〉 for O. When
the quantum state is ρ, the probabilities for the various outcomes are computed from the
eigenprojectors Πi = |i〉〈i| via the standard Born rule,
pi = tr(ρΠi) = 〈i|ρ|i〉 . (4.1)
This rule gives a consistent probability assignment because the eigenprojectors Πi are
positive-semidefinite operators, which makes the pi nonnegative, and because the projec-
tors form a resolution of the identity operator I,
d∑
i=1
Πi = I , (4.2)
which guarantees that
∑
i pi = 1.
POVMs generalize the textbook notion of measurement by distilling the essential prop-
erties that make the Born rule work. The generalized notion of measurement is this: any set
E = {Eα} of positive-semidefinite operators on Hd that forms a resolution of the identity,
i.e., that satisfies
〈ψ|Eα|ψ〉 ≥ 0 , for all |ψ〉 ∈ Hd (4.3)
and ∑
α
Eα = I , (4.4)
corresponds to at least one laboratory procedure counting as a measurement. The outcomes
of the measurement are identified with the indices α, and the probabilities of those outcomes
are computed according to the generalized Born rule,
pα = tr(ρEα) . (4.5)
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The set E is called a POVM, and the operators Eα are called POVM elements. Unlike
von Neumann measurements, there is no limitation on the number of values α can take,
the operators Eα need not be rank-1, and there is no requirement that the Eα be mutually
orthogonal. This definition has important content because the older notion of measure-
ment is simply too restrictive: there are laboratory procedures that clearly should be called
“measurements,” but that cannot be expressed in terms of the von Neumann measurement
process alone.
One might wonder whether the existence of POVMs contradicts everything taught about
standard measurements in the traditional graduate textbooks [64] and the well-known clas-
sics [65]. Fortunately it does not. The reason is that any POVM can be represented formally
as a standard measurement on an ancillary system that has interacted in the past with the
system of main interest. Thus, in a certain sense, von Neumann measurements capture
everything that can be said about quantum measurements [63]. A way to think about this
is that by learning something about the ancillary system through a standard measurement,
one in turn learns something about the system of real interest. Indirect though this might
seem, it can be a very powerful technique, sometimes revealing information that could not
have been revealed otherwise [66].
For instance, by considering POVMs, one can consider measurements with an outcome
cardinality that exceeds the dimensionality of the Hilbert space. What this means is that
whereas the statistics of a von Neumann measurement can only reveal information about the
d diagonal elements of a density operator ρ, through the probabilities tr(ρΠi), the statistics
of a POVM generally can reveal things about the off-diagonal elements, too. It is precisely
this property that we take advantage of in our proof of the quantum de Finetti theorem.
Our problem hinges on finding a special kind of POVM, one for which any set of outcome
probabilities specifies a unique operator. This boils down to a problem in pure linear algebra.
The space of operators on Hd is itself a linear vector space of dimension d 2. The quantity
tr(A†B) serves as an inner product on that space. If the POVM elements Eα span the
space of operators—there must be at least d 2 POVM elements in the set—the measurement
probabilities pα = tr(ρEα)—now thought of as projections in the directions Eα—are sufficient
to specify a unique operator ρ. Two distinct density operators ρ and σ must give rise to
different measurement statistics. Such measurements, which might be called informationally
complete, have been studied for some time [67].
For our proof we need a slightly refined notion—that of a minimal informationally com-
plete measurement. If an informationally complete POVM has more than d 2 operators Eα,
these operators form an overcomplete set. This means that given a set of outcome probabil-
ities pα, there is generally no operator A that generates them according to pα = tr(AEα).
Our proof requires the existence of such an operator, so we need a POVM that has precisely
d 2 linearly independent POVM elements Eα. Such a POVM has the minimal number of
POVM elements to be informationally complete. Given a set of outcome probabilities pα,
there is a unique operator A such that pα = tr(AEα), even though, as we discuss below, A
is not guaranteed to be a density operator.
Do minimal informationally complete POVMs exist? The answer is yes. We give here a
simple way to produce one, though there are surely more elegant ways with greater symmetry.
Start with a complete orthonormal basis |ej〉 on Hd, and let Γjk = |ej〉〈ek|. It is easy to
check that the following d 2 rank-1 projectors Πα form a linearly independent set.
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1. For α = 1, . . . , d, let
Πα ≡ Γjj , (4.6)
where j, too, runs over the values 1, . . . , d.
2. For α = d+ 1, . . . , 1
2
d(d+ 1), let
Πα ≡ Γ(1)jk =
1
2
(
|ej〉+ |ek〉
)(
〈ej|+ 〈ek|
)
=
1
2
(Γjj + Γkk + Γjk + Γkj) , (4.7)
where j < k.
3. Finally, for α = 1
2
d(d+ 1) + 1, . . . , d 2, let
Πα ≡ Γ(2)jk =
1
2
(
|ej〉+ i|ek〉
)(
〈ej| − i〈ek|
)
=
1
2
(Γjj + Γkk − iΓjk + iΓkj) , (4.8)
where again j < k.
All that remains is to transform these (positive-semidefinite) linearly independent operators
Πα into a proper POVM. This can be done by considering the positive semidefinite operator
G defined by
G =
d2∑
α=1
Πα . (4.9)
It is straightforward to show that 〈ψ|G|ψ〉 > 0 for all |ψ〉 6= 0, thus establishing that G is
positive definite (i.e., Hermitian with positive eigenvalues) and hence invertible. Applying
the (invertible) linear transformation X → G−1/2XG−1/2 to Eq. (4.9), we find a valid
decomposition of the identity,
I =
d2∑
α=1
G−1/2ΠαG
−1/2 . (4.10)
The operators
Eα = G
−1/2ΠαG
−1/2 (4.11)
satisfy the conditions of a POVM, Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4), and moreover, they retain the rank
and linear independence of the original Πα.
With this generalized measurement (or any other one like it), we can return to the main
line of proof. Recall we assumed that we captured our state of knowledge by an exchangeable
density operator ρ(N). Consequently, repeated application of the (imagined) measurement
E must give rise to an exchangeable probability distribution over the N random variables
αn ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d 2}, n = 1, . . . , N . We now analyze these probabilities.
Quantum mechanically, it is valid to think of the N repeated measurements of E as a
single measurement on the Hilbert space H⊗Nd ≡ Hd⊗· · ·⊗Hd. This measurement, which we
denote E⊗N , consists of d 2N POVM elements of the form Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗EαN . The probability
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of any particular outcome sequence of length N , namely α ≡ (α1, . . . , αN), is given by the
standard quantum rule,
p(N)(α) = tr( ρ(N) Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EαN ) . (4.12)
Because the distribution p(N)(α) is exchangeable, we have by the classical de Finetti theorem
[see Eq. (2.4)] that there exists a unique probability density P (p) on Sd2 such that
p(N)(α) =
∫
S
d2
P (p) pα1pα2 · · · pαN dp . (4.13)
It should now begin to be apparent why we chose to imagine a measurement E consisting
of precisely d 2 linearly independent elements. This allows us to assert the existence of a
unique operator Ap on Hd corresponding to each point p in the domain of the integral. The
ultimate goal here is to turn Eqs. (4.12) and (4.13) into a single operator equation.
With that in mind, let us define Ap as the unique operator satisfying the following d
2
linear equations:
tr(ApEα) = pα , α = 1, . . . , d
2 . (4.14)
Inserting this definition into Eq. (4.13) and manipulating it according to the algebraic rules
of tensor products—namely (A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = AC ⊗BD and tr(A⊗B) = (trA)(trB)—we
see that
p(N)(α) =
∫
S
d2
P (p) tr(ApEα1) · · · tr(ApEαN ) dp
=
∫
S
d2
P (p) tr(ApEα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ApEαN ) dp
=
∫
S
d2
P (p) tr[A⊗N
p
(Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EαN )] dp . (4.15)
If we further use the linearity of the trace, we can write the same expression as
p(N)(α) = tr
[(∫
S
d2
P (p)A⊗n
p
dp
)
Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EαN
]
. (4.16)
The identity between Eqs. (4.12) and (4.16) must hold for all sequences α. It follows
that
ρ(N) =
∫
S
d2
P (p)A⊗N
p
dp . (4.17)
This is because the operators Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗EαN form a complete basis for the vector space of
operators on H⊗Nd .
Equation (4.17) already looks very much like our sought after goal, but we are not
there quite yet. At this stage one has no right to assert that the Ap are density operators.
Indeed they generally are not: the integral (4.13) ranges over some points p in Sd 2 that
cannot be generated by applying the measurement E to any quantum state. Hence some
of the Ap in the integral representation are ostensibly nonphysical. An example might be
helpful. Consider any four spin-1
2
pure states |nα〉 on H2 for which the vectors nα in the
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Bloch-sphere representation (3.3) are the vertices of a regular tetrahedron. One can check
that the elements Eα =
1
2
|nα〉〈nα| comprise a minimal informationally complete POVM.
For this POVM, because of the factor 1
2
in front of each projector, it is always the case
that pα = tr(ρEα) ≤ 12 . Therefore, this measurement simply cannot generate a probability
distribution like p = (3
4
, 1
8
, 1
16
, 1
16
), which is nevertheless in the domain of the integral in
Eq. (4.13).
The solution to this conundrum is provided by the overall requirement that ρ(N) be a valid
density operator. This requirement places a significantly more stringent constraint on the
distribution P (p) than was the case in the classical representation theorem. In particular, it
must be the case that P (p) vanishes whenever the corresponding Ap is not a proper density
operator. Let us move toward showing that.
We first need to delineate two properties of the operators Ap. One is that they are
Hermitian. The argument is simply
tr(EαA
†
p
) = tr
[
(ApEα)
†] = [tr(ApEα)]∗ = tr(ApEα) , (4.18)
where the last step follows from Eq. (4.14). Because the Eα are a complete set of linearly
independent operators, it follows that A†
p
= Ap. The second property tells us something
about the eigenvalues of Ap:
1 =
∑
α
pα = tr
(
Ap
∑
α
Eα
)
= trAp . (4.19)
In other words the (real) eigenvalues of Ap must sum to unity.
We now show that these two facts go together to imply that if there are any nonphysical
Ap with positive weight P (p) in Eq. (4.17), then one can find a measurement for which ρ
(N)
produces illegal “probabilities” for sufficiently large N . For instance, take a particular Aq
in Eq. (4.17) that has at least one negative eigenvalue −λ < 0. Let |ψ〉 be a normalized
eigenvector corresponding to that eigenvalue and consider the binary-valued POVM consist-
ing of the elements Π˜ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and Π = I − Π˜. Since tr(AqΠ˜) = −λ < 0, it is true by
Eq. (4.19) that tr(AqΠ) = 1 + λ > 1. Consider repeating this measurement over and over.
In particular, let us tabulate the probability of getting outcome Π for every single trial to
the exclusion of all other outcomes.
The gist of the contradiction is most easily seen by imagining that Eq. (4.17) is really a
discrete sum:
ρ(N) = P (q)A⊗N
q
+
∑
p6=q
P (p)A⊗N
p
. (4.20)
The probability of N occurrences of the outcome Π is thus
tr(ρ(N)Π⊗N) = P (q) tr(A⊗N
q
Π⊗N) +
∑
p6=q
P (p) tr(A⊗N
p
Π⊗N )
= P (q) [tr(AqΠ)]
N +
∑
p6=q
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N
= P (q)(1 + λ)N +
∑
p6=q
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N . (4.21)
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There are no assurances in general that the rightmost term in Eq. (4.21) is positive, but if
N is an even number it must be. It follows that if P (q) ≥ 0, for sufficiently large even N ,
tr(ρ(N)Π⊗N) > 1 , (4.22)
contradicting the assumption that it should always be a probability.
All we need to do now is transcribe the argument leading to Eq. (4.22) to the general
integral case of Eq. (4.17). Note that by Eq. (4.14), the quantity tr(ApΠ) is a (linear)
continuous function of the parameter p. Therefore, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such
that |tr(ApΠ)− tr(AqΠ)| ≤ ǫ whenever |p− q| ≤ δ, i.e., whenever p is contained within an
open ball Bδ(q) centered at q. Choose ǫ < λ, and define Bδ to be the intersection of Bδ(q)
with the probability simplex. For p ∈ Bδ, it follows that
tr(ApΠ) ≥ 1 + λ− ǫ > 1 . (4.23)
If we consider an N that is even, [tr(ApΠ)]
N is nonnegative in all of Sd2 , and we have that
the probability of the outcome Π⊗N satisfies
tr(ρ(N)Π⊗N ) =
∫
S
d2
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp
=
∫
S
d2−Bδ
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp +
∫
Bδ
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp
≥
∫
Bδ
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp
≥ (1 + λ− ǫ)N
∫
Bδ
P (p) dp . (4.24)
Unless ∫
Bδ
P (p) dp = 0 , (4.25)
the lower bound (4.24) for the probability of the outcome Π⊗N becomes arbitrarily large as
N → ∞. Thus we conclude that the requirement that ρ(N) be a proper density operator
constrains P (p) to vanish almost everywhere in Bδ and, consequently, to vanish almost
everywhere that Ap is not a physical state.
Using Eq. (4.14), we can trivially transform the integral representation (4.17) to one
directly over the convex set of density operators Dd and be left with the following statement.
Under the sole assumption that the density operator ρ(N) is exchangeable, there exists a
unique probability density P (ρ) such that
ρ(N) =
∫
Dd
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ . (4.26)
This concludes the proof of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem.
V. OUTLOOK
Since the analysis in the previous sections concerned only the case of quantum-state
tomography, we certainly have not written the last word on unknown quantum states in
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the sense advocated in Sec. I. There are clearly other examples that need separate analy-
ses. For instance, the use of unknown states in quantum teleportation [10]—where a single
realization of an unknown state is “teleported” with the aid of previously distributed quan-
tum entanglement and a classical side channel—has not been touched upon. The quantum
de Finetti theorem, therefore, is not the end of the road for detailing implications of an
information-based interpretation of quantum mechanics. What is important, we believe, is
that taking the time to think carefully about the referents of various states in a problem
can lead to insights into the structure of quantum mechanics that cannot be found by other
means.
For instance, one might ask, “Was this theorem not inevitable?” After all, is it not
already well established that quantum theory is, in some sense, just a noncommutative gen-
eralization of probability theory? Should not all the main theorems in classical probability
theory carry over to the quantum case [68]? One can be skeptical in this way, of course,
but then one will miss a large part of the point. There are any number of noncommutative
generalizations to probability theory that one can concoct [70]. The deeper issue is, what
is it in the natural world that forces quantum theory to the particular noncommutative
structure it actually has [71]? It is not a foregone conclusion, for instance, that every theory
has a de Finetti representation theorem within it.
Some insight in this regard can be gained by considering very simple modifications of
quantum theory. To give a concrete example, let us take the case of real-Hilbert-space
quantum mechanics. This theory is the same as ordinary quantum mechanics in all aspects
except that the Hilbert spaces are defined over the field of real numbers rather than the
complex numbers. It turns out that this is a case where the quantum de Finetti theorem
fails. Let us start to explain why by first describing how the particular proof technique used
above loses validity in the new context.
In order to specify uniquely a Hermitian operator ρ(N) in going from Eq. (4.16) to (4.17),
the proof made central use of the fact that a complete basis {E1, . . . , Ed 2} for the vector
space of operators on Hd can be used to generate a complete basis for the operators on
H⊗Nd —one just need take the d 2N operators of the form Eα1⊗ · · · ⊗EαN , 1 ≤ αj ≤ d 2. (All
we actually needed was that a basis for the real vector space of Hermitian operators on Hd
can be used to generate a basis for the real vector space of Hermitian operators on H⊗Nd ,
but since the vector space of all operators is the complexification of the real vector space
of Hermitian operators, this seemingly weaker requirement is, in fact, no different.) This
technique works because the dimension of the space of dN× dN matrices is (d 2)N , the Nth
power of the dimension of the space of d× d matrices.
This technique does not carry over to real Hilbert spaces. In a real Hilbert space, states
and POVM elements are represented by real symmetric matrices. The dimension of the
vector space of real symmetric matrices acting on a d-dimensional real Hilbert space is
1
2
d(d + 1), this then being the number of elements in an minimal informationally complete
POVM. The task in going from Eq. (4.16) to (4.17) would be to specify the real matrix ρ(N).
When N ≥ 2, however, the dimension of the space of dN× dN real symmetric matrices is
strictly greater than the Nth power of the dimension of the space of d × d real symmetric
matrices, i.e.,
1
2
dN(dN + 1) >
(
1
2
d(d+ 1)
)N
. (5.1)
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Hence, specifying Eq. (4.16) for all outcome sequences α = (α1, . . . , αN) is not sufficient
to specify a single operator ρ(N). This line of reasoning indicates that the particular proof
of the quantum de Finetti theorem presented in Sec. IV fails for real Hilbert spaces, but it
does not establish that the theorem itself fails. The main point of this discussion is that
it draws attention to the crucial difference between real-Hilbert-space and complex-Hilbert-
space quantum mechanics—a fact emphasized previously by Araki [26] and Wootters [27].
To show that the theorem fails, we need a counterexample. One such example is provided
by the N -system state
ρ(N) =
1
2
ρ⊗N+ +
1
2
ρ⊗N− , (5.2)
where
ρ+ =
1
2
(I + σ2) and ρ− =
1
2
(I − σ2) , (5.3)
and where σ2 was defined in Eq. (3.2). In complex-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics, this
is clearly a valid density operator: It corresponds to an equally weighted mixture of N
spin-up particles and N spin-down particles in the y direction. The state ρ(N) is clearly
exchangeable, and the decomposition in Eq. (5.2) is unique according to the quantum de
Finetti theorem.
Now consider ρ(N) as an operator in real-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics. Despite the
apparent use of the imaginary number i in the σ2 operator, ρ
(N) remains a valid quantum
state. This is because, upon expanding the right-hand side of Eq. (5.2), all the terms with
an odd number of σ2 operators cancel away. Yet, even though it is an exchangeable density
operator, it cannot be written in de Finetti form of Eq. (3.15) using only real symmetric
operators. This follows because Eq. (5.2), the unique de Finetti form, contains σ2, which is an
antisymmetric operator and cannot be written in terms of symmetric operators. Hence the
de Finetti representation theorem does not hold in real-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics.
Similar considerations show that in quaternionic quantum mechanics (a theory again
precisely the same as ordinary quantum mechanics except that it uses Hilbert spaces over
the quaternionic field [25]), the connection between exchangeable density operators and
decompositions of the de Finetti form (3.15) breaks down. The failure mode is, however,
even more disturbing than for real Hilbert spaces. In quaternionic quantum mechanics, most
operators of the de Finetti form (3.15) do not correspond to valid quaternionic quantum
states, even though the states ρ in the integral are valid quaternionic states. The reason is
that tensor products of quaternionic Hermitian operators are not necessarily Hermitian.
In classical probability theory, exchangeability characterizes those situations where the
only data relevant for updating a probability distribution are frequency data, i.e., the num-
bers nj in Eq. (2.4) which tell how often the result j occurred. The quantum de Finetti
representation shows that the same is true in quantum mechanics: Frequency data (with
respect to a sufficiently robust measurement) are sufficient for updating an exchangeable
state to the point where nothing more can be learned from sequential measurements; that
is, one obtains a convergence of the form (1.4), so that ultimately any further measurements
on the individual systems are statistically independent. That there is no quantum de Finetti
theorem in real Hilbert space means that there are fundamental differences between real and
complex Hilbert spaces with respect to learning from measurement results. The ultimate
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reason for this is that in ordinary, complex-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics, exchange-
ability implies separability, i.e., the absence of entanglement. This follows directly from
the quantum de Finetti theorem, because states of the form Eq. (3.15) are not entangled.
This implication does not carry over to real Hilbert spaces. By the same reasoning used
to show that the de Finetti theorem itself fails, the state in Eq. (5.2) cannot be written as
any mixture of real product states. Interpreted as a state in real Hilbert space, the state
in Eq. (5.2) is thus not separable, but entangled [72]. In a real Hilbert space, exchangeable
states can be entangled and local measurements cannot reveal that.
Beyond these conceptual points, we also believe that the technical methods exhibited
here might be of interest in the practical arena. Recently there has been a large literature
on which classes of measurements have various advantages for tomographic purposes [73,74].
To our knowledge, the present work is the only one to consider tomographic reconstruction
based upon minimal informationally complete POVMs. One can imagine several advantages
to this approach via the fact that such POVMs with rank-one elements are automatically
extreme points in the convex set of all measurements [75].
Furthermore, the classical de Finetti theorem is only the tip of an iceberg with respect
to general questions in statistics to do with exchangeability and various generalizations
of the concept [76]. One should expect no less of quantum exchangeability studies. In
particular here, we are thinking of things like the question of representation theorems for
finitely exchangeable distributions [52,77]. Just as our method for proving the quantum de
Finetti theorem was able to rely heavily on the the classical theorem, so one might expect
similar benefits from the classical results in the case of quantum finite exchangeability—
although there will certainly be new aspects to the quantum case due to the possibility of
entanglement in finite exchangeable states. A practical application of such representation
theorems could be their potential to contribute to the solution of some outstanding problems
in constructing security proofs for various quantum key distribution schemes [78].
In general, our effort in the present paper forms part of a larger program to promote
a consistent information-based interpretation of quantum mechanics and to delineate its
consequences. We find it encouraging that the fruits of this effort may not be restricted
solely to an improved understanding of quantum mechanics, but also possess the potential
to contribute to practical applications.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THE CLASSICAL DE FINETTI THEOREM
In this Appendix we reprise the admirably simple proof of the classical de Finetti repre-
sentation theorem given by Heath and Sudderth [42] for the case of binary variables.
Suppose we have an exchangeable probability assignment forM binary random variables,
x1, x2, . . . , xM , taking on the values 0 and 1. Let p(n,N), N ≤ M , be the probability for n
1s in N trials. Exchangeability guarantees that
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)
p(x1 = 1, . . . , xn = 1, xn+1 = 0, . . . , xN = 0) . (A1)
We can condition the probability on the right on the occurrence of m 1s in all M trials:
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)
M∑
m=0
p(x1 = 1, . . . , xn = 1, xn+1 = 0, . . . , xN = 0 | m,M)p(m,M) . (A2)
Given m 1s in M trials, exchangeability guarantees that the
(
M
m
)
sequences are equally
likely. Thus the situation is identical to drawing from an urn with m 1s on M balls, and we
have that
p(x1 = 1, . . . , xn = 1, xn+1 = 0, . . . , xN = 0 | m,M)
=
m
M
m− 1
M − 1 · · ·
m− (n− 1)
M − (n− 1)
M −m
M − n
M −m− 1
M − n− 1 · · ·
M −m− (N − n− 1)
M − (N − 1)
=
(m)n(M −m)N−n
(M)N
, (A3)
where
(r)q ≡
q−1∏
j=0
(r − j) = r(r − 1) · · · (r − q + 1) = r!
(r − q)! . (A4)
The result is that
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)
M∑
m=0
(m)n(M −m)N−n
(M)N
p(m,M) . (A5)
What remains is to take the limit M →∞, which we can do because of the extendibility
property of exchangeable probabilities. We can write p(n,N) as an integral
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
) ∫ 1
0
(zM)n((1− z)M)N−n
(M)N
PM(z) dz , (A6)
where
PM(z) =
M∑
m=0
p(zM,M)δ(z −m/M) (A7)
23
is a distribution concentrated at the M-trial frequencies m/M . In the limit M →∞, PM(z)
converges to a continuous distribution P∞(z), and the other terms in the integrand go to
zn(1− z)N−n, giving
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)∫ 1
0
zn(1− z)N−nP∞(z) dz . (A8)
We have demonstrated the classical de Finetti representation theorem for binary variables:
If p(n,N) is part of an infinite exchangeable sequence, then it has a de Finetti representation
in terms of a “probability on probabilities” P∞(z). The proof can readily be extended to
nonbinary variables.
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